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The Secured Creditor Exemption: A Fleeting Factor 
m Lender Liability Analysis Under CERCLA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The disposal of hazardous materials is a national problem. The 
horrifying discoveries at Love Canal sparked nationwide concern over 
the implications of hazardous waste disposal. 1 Public protests intensi-
fied over time to encourage governmental intervention and to demand 
effective treatment of the environmental problems that pollute every 
state in the nation. 2 In response, Congress enacted the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA 
or Superfund)3 to facilitate the cleanup of hazardous waste sites as well 
as to provide the necessary financing.' 
The purpose of CERCLA is two-fold: first, to promptly and effec-
tively cleanup hazardous waste sites, and second, to hold responsible 
parties liable for cleanup costs.'1 Responsible parties include current 
"owners and operators"6 of a facility;7 prior owners and operators who 
1. Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corporation had dumped 21,800 tons of toxic wastes into 
the Love Canal. L. Gruson, Ex-Love Canal Families Get Payments, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1985, 
at B I, col. I. Years after the disposal, residents of the Love Canal neighborhood began to suffer 
physical injuries ranging from a variety of cancers and mental retardation to persistent rashes and 
migraine headaches. A lawsuit brought by former residents against the company was settled for 
$20 million. /d. 
2. The General Accounting Office of the United States has found as many as 425,380 poten-
tial hazardous waste sites that require cleanup. GAO Finds 425,380 Potential Superfund Sites: 
Florio Hits EPA for Delays in Site Assessments, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2043 (Jan. 22, 1988). The 
cost of cleaning up only 2,500 or I o/o of these sites is estimated at more than $22 billion. /d. 
3. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified in part as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
9601-9657 (1988)). 
4. Personal Liability for Hazardous Waste Cleanup: An Examination of CERCLA Section 
107, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 643, 649-50 (1986). The Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) was enacted to fill in the gaps left under the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) that Congress enacted in 1976. /d. 
CERCLA, which contained a $1.6 billion Superfund to finance the cleanup of hazardous 
waste sites, was due to expire in 1985, but the Senate passed SSt to re-authorize CERCLA and to 
increase the Superfund to $7.5 billion. Senate Passes $7.5 Billion Superfund Bill with Tax Ad-
ministration Threatened to Veto, 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 931 (Sep. 27, 1985). 
5. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chern. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982). 
6. An individual or entity is considered an owner or operator, "in the case of any facility, 
title or control of which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandon-
ment, or similar means to a unit of State or local government, any person who owned, operated, or 
otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand." 42 U.S.C. § 
9601 (20)(A)(iii). 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l). CERCLA defines facility as: 
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owned or operated any facility at the time "hazardous substances"8 
were disposed of;9 any person who generates or arranges for disposal, 
treatment, or transport of hazardous substances/0 and any person who 
transports hazardous substance for which there is a release or a 
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs. 11 Re-
sponsible parties are liable for all costs of removaP2 or remedial ac-
tion/3 damages for the injury, loss, or destruction of natural resources; 
and the cost of any health assessment or health effects study carried out 
under CERCLA.14 Certain parties, however, are exempt from liability 
under the statute. 16 This note will examine the secured creditor exemp-
(A) any building structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any 
pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, im-
poundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or 
(B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed 
of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located; but does not include any consumer prod-
uct in consumer use or any vessel. 
42 u.s.c. § 9601(9). 
8. Hazardous substances include: 
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33, (B) any 
element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to section 9602 
of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under or 
listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6921] 
(but not including any waste the regulation of which under the Solid Waste Disposal 
Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 6901 et seq.] has been suspended by Congress), (D) any toxic 
pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant 
listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C.A. § 7412], and (F) any immi-
nently hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administra-
tor has taken action pursuant to section 2606 of Title 15. The term does not include 
petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifi-
cally listed or designated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through 
(F) of this paragraph, and the term does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, 
liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and 
such synthetic gas). 
42 u.s.c. § 9601(14). 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2). 
10. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). 
11. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). Response costs include the cost of all removal or remedial action 
taken by the government or an Indian tribe; any other necessary response costs incurred by any 
person consistent with the national contingency plan; damages for injury, destruction, or loss of 
natural resources; and the costs of any health assessment or health effects study. 42 U.S.C. § 
9607(a)(4)(A)-(D). 
12. Removal means the cleanup of "released hazardous substances from the environment, 
[and] such actions as may be necessary ... in the event of the threat of release of hazardous 
substances." 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (23). Removal also includes actions necessary to "monitor, assess, 
and evaluate the release or threat of release ... [and] the disposal of removed material [and other 
actions] necessary to prevent, minimize or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to 
the environment .... " 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23). 
13. Remedial action includes those actions "consistent with permanent remedy taken instead 
of or in addition to removal actions." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). 
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)-(D). 
15. There is an exemption for innocent land owners, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3), and an exemp-
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tion16 of CERCLA and the application of this exemption in the case of 
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp. 17 
The main question examined in Fleet Factors was whether a 
lender removes himself from the protection of the secured creditor ex-
emption by possessing the ability to participate in the management of 
the borrower. More specifically, the question examined was whether 
the standard of liability should be based on capacity or ability to influ-
ence, instead of the previously used standard of liability based on actual 
participation.18 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit con-
cluded that a lender who possesses the capacity or ability to participate 
in the management of the borrower is liable under CERCLA. This 
note will show that (1) the Eleventh Circuit used a nebulous test in 
determining the scope of the secured creditor exemption, (2) subsequent 
application of the test will be detrimental to the environment and con-
tradict the goals of CERCLA, and (3) alternative tests before Congress 
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) discredit the credibil-
ity of the Fleet Factors test. 
A. The Secured Creditor Exemption 
The secured creditor exemption excludes from the definition of 
owner and operator "any person, who, without participating in the 
management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily 
to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility." 19 Originally this 
exemption was not included in CERCLA.20 However, Congress added 
the exemption to protect from liability title holders who do not partici-
pate in the management of the facility and who are not affiliated in any 
way with the leasing or operating of the facility. 21 
tion for secured creditors, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). This note will discuss only the latter. 
16. See infra note 19 and accompanying text. 
17. 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988), affd, remanded, 901 F.2d 1550 (lith Cir. 1990), 
cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 752 (1991). 
18. See United States v. Mirabile, No. 84-2280, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 1985). 
19. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20)(A)(iii) (1988). 
20. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1558 n.IJ (lith Cir. 1990), 
cert. denied, IllS. Ct. 752 (1991) (citing S. 1480, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 2 SENATE 
COMM. ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC WoRKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., I A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF CERCLA 470 (Comm. Print 1983)). 
21. ld. (citing remarks of Rep. Harsha, reprinted in 2 SENATE CoMM. ON ENVIRONMEN-
TAL AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., 2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CERCLA 945 
(Comm. Print 1983)). 
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B. Lender Liability Before Fleet Factors 
Prior to the enactment of environmental statutory relief, the com-
mon law doctrines of toxic tort and nuisance were the only remedies 
available for injuries resulting from improper hazardous waste dispo-
sal.22 In response to public outrage and the enormous cleanup costs of 
innumerable23 contaminated sites around the country, the government 
created CERCLA and gave the EPA the authority to enforce CER-
CLA regulations. 
CERCLA is armed with a large bore barrel of joint and several 
liability that fires with minimal precision, holding its victims strictly 
liable. While this method of broad sweeping liability serves to finance 
costly cleanup activities, it also causes extreme hardship to the parties 
involved. Recently, this view has allowed the courts to impose liability 
on lenders who foreclose on secured property that has been poisoned by 
previous owners.2 ' In Fleet Factors, the Eleventh Circuit developed a 
test that will further expand lender liability under the fa~ade of "clean-
ing up the environment," while neglecting the fundamental principle of 
causationally-linked liability. 
II. UNITED STATES v. FLEET FACTORS CoRP. 
A. The Facts 
In 1976, Fleet Factors Corp. (Fleet) entered into a factoring 
agreement with a cloth printing facility.~& Fleet advanced funds against 
the assignment of the facility's accounts receivable and, in return, ob-
tained a security interest in the facility and all of its equipment, fix-
tures, and inventory.26 The cloth printing facility filed for bankruptcy 
under Chapter Eleven in 1979 and in December 1981 was adjudicated 
as bankrupt under Chapter Seven.27 During this time, the factoring 
agreement continued under court order. On February 27, 1981, the fa-
cility discontinued operations and began to liquidate its inventory.28 
Fleet foreclosed on some of the facility's inventory and equipment 
22. Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Tort: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HoF-
STRA L. REV. 859, 864 (1981). These common law remedies have proven ineffective because of 
various legal obstacles that prevent recovery. ld. at 920-28. 
23. See supra note 2. 
24. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 579-80 (D. Md. 1986). 
25. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1553 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
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in May 1982.29 Fleet then hired a professional liquidator to auction off 
the collateral. After the auctioned collateral was removed (under the 
responsibility of the purchasers), Fleet hired a third party to remove 
the remaining collateral and to clean the premise. 30 
The EPA inspected the facility on January 20, 1984, and incurred 
costs of nearly $400,000 in responding to the toxic chemicals and asbes-
tos contamination at the site. The cloth printing facility failed to pay 
taxes on the property; therefore, the facility was conveyed to the state of 
Georgia at a foreclosure sale on July 7, 1987.31 
The government sued both the owners of the cloth printing facility 
and Fleet Factors under CERCLA to recover the cleanup costs.32 The 
district court granted the government's motion for partial summary 
judgment on the liability of the owners of the facility but denied the 
government's motion for partial summary judgment on the liability of 
Fleet.33 Likewise, the court denied Fleet's cross motion for summary 
judgment because genuine issues of material fact existed concerning 
Fleet's activities at the facility. Fleet's request of interlocutory appeal 
was granted. 34 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's hold-
ing and remanded the case for further proceedings. 311 
B. The "Capacity to Influence" Test 
To achieve the "overwhelmingly remedial" goal of CERCLA, the 
Eleventh Circuit found Fleet potentially liable under the following test: 
[A] secured creditor may incur section 9607(a)(2) liability, without 
being an operator, by participating in the financial management of a 
facility to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's 
treatment of hazardous wastes. It is not necessary for the secured 
creditor actually to involve itself in the day-to-day operations of the 
facility in order to be liable .... Nor is it necessary for the secured 
creditor to participate in the management decisions relating to haz-
ardous waste. Rather, a secured creditor will be liable if its involve-
ment with the management of the facility is sufficiently broad to sup-
port the inference that it could affect hazardous waste disposal 
decisions if it so chose. 88 
The "capacity to influence" test employs a standard of ability to 
29. /d. 
30. This was accomplished by the end of December 1983. ld. at 1552-53. 
31. /d. at 1553. 
32. /d. 
33. /d. at 1556. 
34. /d. at 1553. 
35. /d. at 1560. 
36. /d. at 1557-58 (footnotes omitted). 
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influence instead of a standard of action. This standard IS difficult to 
apply in practice, is impossible to measure, and sets no guidelines for 
future credit transactions. 
C. Reasoning Used by the Eleventh Circuit 
After refusing the government's argument that Fleet was liable 
under 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(1),37 the Eleventh Circuit addressed Fleet's 
liability under 9607(a)(2). Acknowledging that Fleet carried the burden 
of establishing its entitlement to the secured creditor exemption, the 
court viewed the critical issue to be whether Fleet participated in the 
management sufficiently to incur liability under the statute. 38 
The Eleventh Circuit expressly rejected the test previously used by 
some district courts which differentiated between "permissible partici-
pation in the financial management of the facility and impermissible 
participation in the day-to-day or operational management of a facil-
ity."39 The Eleventh Circuit found this "construction of the statutory 
exemption too permissive towards secured creditors who are involved 
with toxic waste facilities."40 To achieve the goals41 of CERCLA, the 
court reasoned that "ambiguous statutory terms should be construed to 
37. This section holds the owner and operator of a vessel or facility subject to liability. Under 
CERCLA, a state or local government that has acquired title to a facility due to tax delinquency 
(like the present case), or similar means, is not liable. Instead, the statute places liability on any 
person who owned, operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately before-
hand. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (20)(A)(iii) (1988). 
38. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1555. 
39. /d. at 1556. (citing United States v. Mirabile, No. 84-2280, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 
6, 1985)) ("participation which is critical is participation in operational, production, or waste 
disposal activities"); accord United States v. New Castle County, 727 F. Supp. 854, 866 (D. Del. 
1989); Rockwell Int'l v. IU Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384 , 1390 (N.D. Ill. 1988). In Mirabile, a 
Pennsylvania federal district court held that a lender must be involved in the day-to-day opera-
tional affairs of the borrower before it can be held liable. Mirabile, No. 84-2280, at 3. Mere 
financial ability to control waste disposal practices was not considered sufficient for the imposition 
of liability. /d. The court examined the legislative history, which defined operator to be a person 
who is carrying out operational functions for the owner or the facility pursuant to an appropriate 
agreement. /d. This test enables both lender and debtor to know the extent of their respective 
liabilities and responsibilities governing the management of hazardous waste. While some claim 
that the "operational test" may allow creditors to indirectly manage the "affairs" of the debtor and 
at the same time dodge the liability bullet, these concerns appear minimal because of the well 
publicized examples of hazardous waste polluters currently experiencing the bankruptcy blues. 
40. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557. To date, the Ninth Circuit is the only other federal 
court of appeals to address the parameters of the "participating in the management" phrase. Berg-
soe Metal Corp. v. East Asiatic Co., 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990). In Bergsoe, the Ninth Circuit 
refused to delineate specific guidelines for subsequent interpretation of the secured creditor exemp-
tion but noted that "there must be some actual management of the facility before a secured credi-
tor will fall outside the exception." /d. at 672 (emphasis in original). 
41. The goals of CERCLA are to cleanup hazardous waste sites and to hold responsible 
parties liable for the cost. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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favor liability for the costs incurred by the government in responding to 
the hazards at such facilities."42 
Ill. ANALYSIS 
After opening the "pro-liability" door with the knock of ambigu-
ity, the Eleventh Circuit turns the key of plain language to lock shut 
this same door from the district courts' so-called broad interpretation.43 
The Eleventh Circuit construed the district courts' interpretation"" as 
"ignor[ing] the plain language of the exemption and render[ing] it 
meaningless. " 411 
A. Plain Language of the Secured Creditor Exemption 
"It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must . . . be 
sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if it is plain, the 
sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms."46 The 
plain language of 9607(a)(2) seemingly absolves liability from the se-
cured creditor who holds indicia of ownership in the facility without 
participating in the management of the facility.47 The district court's 
interpretation more closely parallels the plain language of the statute 
than that of the court of appeals.48 The exemption specifically excludes 
from the definition of owner or operator any person who, without par-
ticipating in the management of the facility, holds indicia of ownership 
to protect a security interest in the facility. 49 Therefore, secured credi-
42. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557. 
43. The court's analysis here is suspect. First, the court labels the statutory terms as ambigu-
ous and therefore reasons that the terms "must be construed to favor liability for the costs incurred 
by the government in responding to the hazards at such facilities." United States v. Fleet Factors 
Corp., 901 F.2d 1550,1557 (lith Cir. 1990), cert. denied, IllS. Ct. 752 (1991). This pro-
liability presumption evolves from the remedial goals of CERCLA. Next, the court invokes the 
plain meaning doctrine and applies it to the same statutory terms it had previously labeled ambig-
uous. /d. This contradiction appears to be nothing more than judicial reasoning used to reach a 
desired end by simply brushing the issue of causation under a remedial rug. 
44. The Eleventh Circuit termed the district court's interpretation as awkward, "essentially 
requir[ing] a secured creditor to be involved in the operations of the facility in order to incur 
liability." Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557. 
45. /d. 
46. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). 
47. This is true as long as ownership is held to protect the security interest and not used as 
an investment. 
48. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that those involved in 
the operations of a facility are already liable as operators under the statute. /d. Therefore, the 
court concluded that, "[h]ad Congress intended to absolve secured creditors from ownership liabil-
ity it would have done so." /d. This is precisely what Congress did by exempting secured creditors 
from liability as long as they didn't participate in the management of the facility. 
49. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(10)(A) (1988). 
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tors who do not cross the "participating in the management" line are 
not considered either operators or owners for liability purposes. In 
other words, Congress absolves secured creditors from ownership liabil-
ity as long as they remain within the permissible boundaries. 
B. Can the Secured Creditor Exemption Survive Fleet Factors? 
The Eleventh Circuit's holding severely limits the scope of the se-
cured creditor exemption, if not eliminating it completely. Under the 
court's view, a secured creditor can incur CERCLA liability by merely 
participating in the financial management of a facility if participation 
includes the capacity to influence the debtor's treatment of hazardous 
waste. 110 The Eleventh Circuit's rationale for narrowing the secured 
creditor exemption was to force creditors to thoroughly investigate the 
potential debtor's waste treatment systems and policies. If the potential 
creditor finds that the debtor's systems and policies do not meet the 
requirements set forth in the appropriate environmental statutes, the 
creditor will require the potential debtor to seek money from another 
source, to bear the cost of possible CERCLA liability weighed into the 
terms of the agreement, or to reconstruct its hazardous waste policies 
and systems to the satisfaction of the creditor. 
The Eleventh Circuit's belief that secured creditors should police 
hazardous waste policy and management rests on supply and demand 
principles coupled with unjust enrichment. By holding lenders liable, 
the debtors of the world will be required to comply with the regulatory 
restrictions mandated by Congress or they will not obtain the financial 
support they need to operate. While these arguments appear theoreti-
cally sound, the practical application and consequence of a capacity to 
influence test is not nearly as persuasive. These results are not consis-
tent with the goals of CERCLA. Little justification exists for making 
the secured creditor a monitor of hazardous waste systems and 
policies. 111 
50. The court noted that "a secured creditor will be liable if its involvement with the man-
agement of the facility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect hazardous 
waste disposal decisions if it so chose." Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558. 
51. Under the current application of environmental regulations, financial institutions are re-
quired to perform environmental audits on a routine basis. There is no express statutory language 
that requires such audits. However, recent federal court decisions holding lenders potentially liable 
for cleanup costs has forced good business practice to include environmental reports. These audits 
can range from $10,000 to $50,000, or more, per audit. When conducted several times during the 
life of the loan, the increased transactional costs are tremendous. While a large portion of these 
costs will be shifted to the borrower, this increase disproportionately effects small business lenders 
and bluntly applies punitive measures on borrowers as a whole. The very possibility that the 
debtor's property may become polluted, which in turn can cause the lender to lose the entire value 
of the loan, is substantial incentive for the lender to conduct his affairs in an environmentally 
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C. The Effect of a Capacity to Influence Test 
The test laid down by the Eleventh Circuit is extremely vague and 
will most likely frustrate the very goals it purports to achieve. Capac-
ity112 to influence113 can be interpreted in a myriad of ways.114 Arguably, 
every lender could be held liable under the capacity to influence the-
ory.n Until the courts have created a workable definition of this liabil-
ity based on the capacity to influence, creditors will have a difficult 
time structuring their transactions to avoid potential liability.116 This 
will force creditors to deny potential debtors the right to acquire neces-
sary funds if the slightest risk of CERCLA liability is present, since the 
court will find that a lender who is aware of a debtor's potential CER-
CLA liability has the capacity to influence hazardous waste manage-
ment. While the potential liability to lenders is devastating,117 the effect 
of potential lender liability will also have a crippling ripple effect on 
farms and small businesses that ordinarily would be eligible for finan-
cial advancement (such as auto shops, gas stations, and dry cleaners).118 
Also, "[i]ncreased caution on lenders' part will probably result in more 
bankruptcies, since helping a borrower overcome financial difficulties 
will seldom be worth the risk of cleanup liability."119 
As the number of bankruptcies increase, the number of responsible 
parties that are financially capable of bearing the burden of cleanup 
sensitive manner. 
52. The applicable definition of capacity is "the legal authority or competence." WEBSTER's 
Nt:W WoRLD DICTIONARY 209 (2d ed. 1982). 
53. Influence means "the ability of a person or group to produce effects indirectly by means 
of power based on wealth, high position, etc." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 722 (2d ed. 
1982). 
54. For example, every secured creditor theoretically possesses the ability to influence the 
borrower to the extent that the lender has extended credit. 
55. For a review of commercial lending law in this context, see Comment, When a Security 
Becomes a Liability: Claims Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 
1261, 1271 (1987). 
56. If room for error is considered, the creditors will be forced to err on the safe side of non-
participation. 
57. Steven A. Seelig, Director of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's Division of 
Liquidation (FDIC), recently asked Senator Jake Garn (R-Utah) to "tighten language clarifying 
the agencies' immunity and make it transferrable to asset purchasers." FDIC, Resolution Trust 
Corp. Seek Protection in Senate Bill Limiting Exposure Under CERCLA, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 
533-34 (July 27, 1990). Because of the Fleet Factors ruling, the FDIC could be liable for clean 
up costs on properties it holds for liquidation. FDIC has identified approximately 270 assets held 
by the agency for liquidation that have potentially serious hazardous waste problems. The book 
value of these properties is approximately $365 million. Estimates for cleanup on these properties 
may be more than three times their market value. /d. 
58. Bankers, Lawyers, Businesses Endorse LaFalce CERCLA Lender Liability Legislation, 
21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 344 (June 15, 1990). 
59. Fleet Factors Complains to Supreme Court That CERCLA Ruling Disrupts Commer-
cial Lending, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1116-17 (Oct. 5, 1990). 
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costs decrease. The public is therefore required to absorb the cleanup 
costs,60 frustrating the goal of CERCLA.61 
D. Possible Solutions to the Overly Broad Test in Fleet Factors 
1. Legislative resolution 
Senator Jake Garn (R-Utah) introduced Senate Bill 282762 in 
March 1990, but the bill was stalled because environmentalists success-
fully argued that the measure was too broad and represented a sweep-
ing bailout for banks.63 Senator Garn has subsequently revised his pro-
posal to address the controversial decision in Fleet Factors.64 The 
proposed legislation limits the liability of depository institutions, other 
mortgage lenders, and the federal banking agencies for environmental 
releases they did not cause. The bill also protects lenders if they ac-
quire, control, or hold property in a fiduciary capacity. 611 Further, it 
replaces the strict liability scheme currently used under CERCLA by 
limiting lenders' liability to the actual benefit conferred on them by an 
environmental cleanup operation.66 Under the bill, liability is only trig-
gered if the institution causes a release or if the institution has actual 
knowledge that a hazardous material is being stored on the property 
and fails to take reasonable actions necessary to prevent its release. 
Small Business Committee Chairman John LaFalce (D-NY) is 
sponsoring House Resolution 449467 which excludes from liability both 
lenders when they foreclose on contaminated property and fiduciaries 
that take title or control of property as part of a trust or estate.68 
LaFalce's attempt to get the bill passed in 1990 failed. However, both 
the Garn bill and the LaFalce bill were reintroduced to Congress in 
March 1 991.69 
60. When the responsible parties cannot pay for the cleanup, the government uses the money 
from the Superfund, which is supported by tax dollars from big industry and from the public at 
large. 
61. Under this scenario, remedial response to Superfund sites will be inadequate due to lack 
of funding. The goals of CERCLA will be frustrated because Superfund sites will not be cleaned 
up, and those sites that are recovered will be financed by the Superfund itself (the taxpayers). 
62. S. 2827, JOist Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CoNG. Rn:. 9217 (1990). 
63. Garn, Lautenberg Drafting Compromise Bill to Shield Banks from Superfund, 11 In-
side EPA Weekly Rep. (Inside Wash.) No. 41, at 6 (Oct. 12, 1990). 
64. Utah Senator Submits Lender Liability Bill: House Measure Continues to Gather Spon-
sors, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 482 (July 13, 1990). 
65. ld. 
66. ld. 
67. H.R. 4494, JOist Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CoNG. REc. 1503 (1990). 
68. Bankers, Lawyers, Businesses Endorse LaFalce CERCLA Lender Liability Legislation, 
21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 344 (June 15, 1990). 
69. S. 3279, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CoNG. REr:. 3279 (1991) (Garn Bill); H.R. 1769, 
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Legislative correction will probably be the most effective and effi-
cient means of revitalizing the secured creditor exemption under CER-
CLA. A potential problem, though, is that the legislative body is ex-
tremely sensitive to political lobbying and to influence from various 
groups. This sensitivity, however, can help create a bill that accom-
plishes the overall goals of cleaning up the environment while at the 
same time allowing the financial community to provide adequate ser-
vices to the struggling economy. 
2. Administrative rule-making resolution 
James Strock, EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement, told 
a House panel that a rule to preserve the secured creditor exemption 
under CERCLA is under development.70 He reported: 
In sum, we believe that a rule or legislation that defines a 'safe har-
bor' in which lenders could take responsible actions without incurring 
CERCLA liability is a valuable approach. Although EPA favors an 
administrative rule-making rather than a legislative attempt to clarify 
the status, if Congress concludes that legislation is necessary, EPA 
would not oppose legislation that is narrowly focused on the lender 
liability issue and includes the provisions mentioned.71 
The proposed rule defines the term "participating in the manage-
ment" and also describes actions that would invoke liability on secured 
lenders.72 Since the EPA is experienced in promulgating rules gov-
erning the environment, courts tend to take the slightest ambiguities in 
102nd Cong., 1st Sess., 137 CONG. REc. 1769 (1991) (LaFalce Bill). The Garn bill is very similar 
to Senate Bill 2827, but does contain certain modifications made after testimonies received during 
banking committee hearings on Senate Bill 2827. 137 CoNG. REc. 3279 (1991). The LaFalce bill 
however has undergone considerable modification and is based on a draft rule prepared by the 
EPA on the secured creditor exemption. 137 CoNG. REC. 1769 (1991). For a further discussion of 
the proposed EPA rule, see infra note 72. 
70. EPA Official Tells House Panel of Shift in Policy Towards Lenders, CERCLA Liability, 
21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 756 (Aug. 10, 1990). 
71. /d. 
72. Participation in the management of a facility is defined as "actual operational participa-
tion by the lender, and does not include the mere capacity or ability to influence facility opera-
tions." EPA Draft Proposal Defining Lender Liability Issues Under The Secured Creditor Ex-
emption of Cercla, 21 Env't Rep. (BN A) 1162, 1165 (Oct. 12, 1990). Although this rule reflects 
the "operational test," some serious procedural defects may decrease its enforceability. First, since 
the EPA is promulgating the rule as an interpretative rule, it may give guidance to courts, but it is 
not legally binding on them. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977). Second, the 
proposed rule does not discuss the applicability of the rule in citizen suits. Therefore, the rule will 
be used when the EPA is a party. If, however, the suit involves a "citizen suit plaintiff," the rule 
could be deemed irrelevant. Another potential problem is that an agency retains the right to 
change or discontinue following a rule that it has promulgated. American Petroleum lnst. v. 
United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 906 F.2d 729, 738 n.ll (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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the rules and resolve them consistent to the broad reaching goals set 
forth by the EPA. This tends to result in far-reaching decisions that 
transform slight ambiguities into subjectively-based monumental deci-
sions never contemplated by those who drafted the rules.73 
3. judicial resolution 
Judicial resolution is arguably the most inefficient method of rem-
edying the present issue. Realistically, however, the courts are where 
the issue will be debated during the next several months. In their ef-
forts to resolve lender liability issues, courts should take note of the 
current legislative and administrative efforts to address the role of the 
secured creditor exemption under CERCLA. Sweeping statutory ex-
emptions under the rug with the "overwhelmingly remedial goals" of 
CERCLA is no longer justifiable. Clearly, such results were never the 
intent of the statute. Until the statute is amended or altered, the courts 
should apply the actual participation test discussed in Mirabile. 14 The 
Mirabile test more closely reflects both the current intent of Congress 
and the EPA regarding the secured creditor exemption. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The "capacity to influence" test used by Eleventh Circuit in Fleet 
Factors is vague and counterproductive to the goals of CERCLA. Until 
the secured creditor exemption is clarified by Congress or the EPA, 
courts should apply the "actual participation standard" (being involved 
in the day-to-day operations of the facility) as discussed in Mirabile.n 
Bret W. Reich 
73. Fleet Factors is a classical example. Here, broad judicial interpretation of CERCLA's 
goals has essentially eliminated any protection previously intended in the secured creditor exemp-
tion. Thus, while construing those goals, one judicial eye remains wide open to the light of liability 
while the other is blinded by "overwhelming" statutory goals. This judicial vision purports to 
follow congressional intent but may be nothing more than a respectful wink. 
74. United States v. Mirabile, No. 84-2280, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 1985). 
75. /d. 
